Browse by Year
/ 2003
/ October
/ Thursday, October 23, 2003
[Federal Register: October 23, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 205)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 60831-60839]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr23oc03-9]
[[Page 60831]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Part IV
Department of Transportation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Aviation Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
14 CFR Parts 91, 121 and 135
Air Tour Operators in the State of Hawaii; Final Rule
[[Page 60832]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 91, 121 and 135
[Docket No. FAA-2003-14830; Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR)
No. 71]
RIN 2120-AH02
Air Tour Operators in the State of Hawaii
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This final rule continues the existing safety requirements in
Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 71 (SFAR 71) and eliminates the
termination date for SFAR 71. The procedural, operational, and
equipment safety requirements of SFAR 71 will continue to apply to
Parts 91, 121, and 135 air tour operators in Hawaii. SFAR 71 does not
apply to operations conducted under part 121 in airplanes with a
passenger-seating configuration of more than 30 seats and a payload
capacity of more than 7,500 pounds or to flights conducted in gliders
or hot air balloons.
DATES: This final rule is effective October 26, 2003.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alberta Brown, Aviation Safety
Inspector, Air Transportation Division, AFS-200, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; Telephone (202) 267-8321, or by e-mail at Alberta.Brown@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Availability of the Rulemaking Documents
You can download an electronic copy of this final rule through the
Internet by:
(1) Searching the Department of Transportation's (DOT) electronic
Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search); by
going to the DOT in person; or by requesting by mail to DOT at 400
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590;
(2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking's Web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/armhome.htm
; or
(3) Accessing the Federal Register's Web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html
.
You also can get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make
sure you put docket number FAA-2003-14830 on your request, to identify
this rulemaking.
You may review the public docket containing this final rule, any
comments received, and any final disposition, in person in the Docket
Management System office (see address above) between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Privacy Act
Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments
received into our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the
comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Statement in the Federal Register published on April
11, 2000 (volume 65, Number 70, pages 19477-78), or you may visit
http://dms.dot.gov.
Small Entity Inquiries
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(SBREFA) requires the FAA to comply with small entities requests for
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations
within its jurisdiction. Internet users can find additional information
on SBREFA on the FAA's Web page at http://www.2faa.gov/avr/arm/sbref.htm.
Persons without Internet access may call the office of
rulemaking at (202) 267-8677 for more information.
Background
On August 8, 2003, the FAA published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) that would continue the safety requirements of SFAR
71 and eliminate its termination date. (68 FR 47269) The FAA omitted
the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis from the final document. Therefore,
on August 20, 2003, the FAA published a correction to the proposed rule
including the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (68 FR 50085).
Summary of Comment on the Proposal
Note: ``Petitioners'' as used in this summary of comments refers
to the 15 petitioners who filed a petition for rulemaking to operate
helicopters at 300 feet above uncongested terrain, dated October 15,
2002, Docket FAA-2002-13959. The petition may also be reviewed in
Docket FAA-2003-14830. All material and relevant comments have been
reviewed. Most of the comments raised issues that the FAA has
already addressed in prior rulemakings regarding this SFAR.
Eliminate SFAR 71
Some commenters want SFAR 71 eliminated completely. They maintain
that the air tour operators in Hawaii should be allowed to operate
under parts 91 and 135 like the rest of the air tour operators in the
United States. They claim that the SFAR's additional requirements have
not reduced the accident rate, or fatalities, and may have contributed
to accidents and fatalities. These commenters believe that restrictions
are unnecessary because SFAR 71 adds to pilot workload and fatigue.
These commenters argue that pilot judgment should dictate altitude and
standoff distances, not the SFAR, in accordance with regulatory
practices and flight conditions. Some individual pilots state that the
SFAR's 1500-foot altitude minimum has forced them into controlled
airspace to maintain cloud clearance. They also state the SFAR's
minimum altitude requirements increase the possibility of flying
inadvertently into instrument meteorological conditions.
FAA Response
The issues from the comments summarized above have been addressed
in prior rulemakings concerning SFAR 71. Commenters have provided no
new information.
SFAR 71 as a Noise Abatement Rule
Some commenters continue to refer to SFAR 71 as a noise abatement
regulation and ask the FAA to continue the rule or enhance it. Others
maintain that SFAR 71 was issued to address noise and environmental
issues, not safety, and want the SFAR eliminated. Elected officials and
environmental groups characterize SFAR 71 as reducing noise pollution
in Hawaii's national parks, forests, and scenic wildlife areas and ask
for its continuation or enhancement.
FAA Response
In 1994, the FAA issued SFAR 71 as an emergency final rule because
of the increase in the number of fatal accidents involving air tour
aircraft during the period 1991-1994 and the causes of those accidents.
The FAA extended the SFAR in 1997 and 2000 to keep the SFAR's safety
requirements in place. There were Congressional concerns that noise
could be addressed at the same time, but noise was not the reason for
issuing the rule. The FAA's mandate for this rulemaking was safety. The
comments regarding noise, noise impacts, and noise benefits are
speculative.
[[Page 60833]]
Commenters Proposing Changes to SFAR 71
Elected officials, the Sierra Club, and some commenters seek
elimination of the SFAR's 500-foot deviations or ``exemptions'' from
the minimum altitude requirements. They believe that eliminating the
deviations would mean less noise and less impact on the human
environment, forests, and plants of Hawaii.
Elected officials and other commenters oppose petitioners' request
that the FAA amend the SFAR to allow tour helicopter flights at 300
feet above uncongested terrain because they believe noise would
increase.
Still other elected officials and commenters want to raise the
SFAR's minimum altitudes because they believe air tour operations at
higher altitudes would generate less noise.
Still other commenters request that overflights of national parks
in Hawaii be eliminated.
The petitioners and some commenters want to lower minimum altitudes
and standoff distances for helicopters because that would allow
helicopters to fly comfortably in the rainforest and away from
populated noise-sensitive areas. They claim it would greatly reduce air
traffic in the SFAR's flight corridors.
FAA's Response
SFAR 71 continues to serve a safety purpose. The FAA chooses to
continue the altitude minimums and the deviation authority of SFAR 71
for safety reasons. The minimum altitude and standoff distances provide
pilots with more time to make decisions, to recover in the event of an
error, or land in the event of an emergency. Because the FAA maintains
control of deviations, they reduce the potential for congestion over a
particular site at the SFAR's 1500-foot altitude while still allowing
for a safe landing in the event of engine failure. The SFAR's
regulatory safety requirements were promulgated based on NTSB safety
recommendations. We disagree that the minimum altitudes and stand off
distances should be increased, or decreased, for alleged noise
benefits. Noise abatement is beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
Overflights of the national parks are part of the national airspace
system. The National Parks Air Tour Management Act of 2000 (the Act)
was enacted on April 5, 2000. The Act applies to any person who
conducts a commercial air tour operation over a unit of the National
Park System, over tribal lands that are within or abutting a unit of
the National Park System, or any area within \1/2\ mile outside a unit
of the National Park System. The regulations codifying the National
Parks Air Tour Management Act of 2000 can be found in Title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 136. The FAA has no mandate to eliminate
overflights of national parks. Banning or restricting air tour aircraft
from national parks, or other areas, for asserted noise benefits or to
avoid asserted impacts, is beyond the scope of this rule.
The national parks in Hawaii will be subject to the development of
an ATMP under 14 CFR Part 136 (67 FR 65667; October 25, 2002). The FAA
encourages persons interested in the development of these ATMPs to
visit the Web site at http://www.atmp.faa.gov. There you may search by
individual park for the status of any ATMP development.
Potential for Mid-Air Collisions
Commenters' concerns on the potential for mid-air collisions can be
divided into four categories:
(1) The mix of airplanes and helicopters;
(2) Congestion at the same altitude;
(3) The use of different frequencies; and
(4) Weather-related factors.
(1) Commenters state that helicopters should not be flown in an
airplane environment. A helicopter pilot's initial reaction to
unforecasted poor weather, and/or a mechanical problem, is to
immediately descend to a lower altitude with slower airspeed. Fixed-
wing aircraft do not have this option.
(2) A commenter states that the primary routes for small commuter
and private fixed wing aircraft around the Hawaiian Islands are around
the coastal shorelines 1000-2500 MSL. This commenter maintains that
SFAR 71 places Hawaii air tour helicopters at the same altitudes, in
opposite directions, and at points of no two-way communications with
commuter and general aviation aircraft.
Petitioners and commenters state that because of SFAR 71's altitude
requirement and the normal orographic cloud ceiling that forms along
the windward sides of the Hawaiian islands, helicopter tours are often
forced to fly over, or close to, coastal communities. In these
circumstances, general aviation airplanes fly low to stay below the
helicopters. Commenters maintain that the practice is contrary to safe
practices and increases the potential risk of midair collisions as well
as noise exposure.
(3) Commenters find that because one aircraft may be on a common
frequency and another on an airport frequency, they may not be able to
talk to each other. If these aircraft are at the same altitude, this
could be a problem.
Another individual comments that the present route structures tend
to concentrate air traffic too densely in certain areas presenting
greater midair accident potential. Examples are the Pahoa NDM and the
``Mill'' in Hilo. At these points a pilot must fly between frequencies
or off communication frequencies to monitor STID in very critical
areas.
(4) Commenters also state that in marginal weather, SFAR 71
concentrates air traffic along specific routes, which is not conducive
to a safe flight environment. Pilots have come close to mid-air
collisions in the valleys and open areas because the SFAR requires them
to maintain the same altitudes in the same areas. Pilots are forced to
fly over noise sensitive areas at 1,500 feet above the surface when
they could have avoided the areas if they could have flown lower and
not had such cloud restriction rules.
FAA Response
The FAA is not aware of any safety issue with allowing helicopters
and airplanes to operate in the same airspace in Hawaii. The air tour
environment in Hawaii is ``see and be seen.'' There has been no
identified problem with mid-air accidents in Hawaii; the preponderance
of accidents involve weather factors and engine shutdowns with the
pilot having insufficient time to recover or no place to land.
The SFAR has never prescribed routes, and this rulemaking did not
propose doing so. If the FAA were to propose routes, to include
frequencies, it would have to be done in a separate rulemaking.
The FAA is aware of areas all over the country where certain
aircraft operate safely on different frequencies. If air tour operators
have identified an issue that needs to be brought to the attention of
the local flight standards district office or air traffic control
facility, then those offices will work with the operators to develop a
common frequency format for the areas of concern. Through their own
organizations, operators can develop common frequency monitoring
procedures, and in an emergency, a guard channel can be used. The FAA
is not aware of any reason to develop rules that will regulate the
routes in these areas, and a proposal was not included in this
document.
Standoff Distances in Valleys
Commenters suggest that complying with the SFAR's 1,500-foot
standoff
[[Page 60834]]
distances in narrow valleys makes a safe environment hazardous because
they must fly in the middle of the valley rather than near the sides
where there is less wind turbulence.
FAA Response
We disagree. The FAA did not propose to make changes to the
standoff distances in this rulemaking. The FAA does not agree that the
SFAR's standoff distances should be reduced or eliminated for valleys
for the reasons discussed in this and prior rulemakings. The commenters
have not presented a compelling safety argument for reducing the rule's
baseline standoff distance. Generally speaking, the greater the
standoff distance, the greater the chances that the pilot can avoid a
collision with steep rugged terrain. The FAA has granted deviations
from the baseline standoff distance after making safety assessments on
a location-by-location basis.
The National Air Tour Safety Rule
A commenter states that to codify the flawed SFAR instead of
designing a national air tour policy is unsound. A proposed national
rule would force the FAA to provide a competent safety analysis. A
national rule would eliminate the ``improper and extraordinary impact
on the rulemaking process heretofore enjoyed by the Hawaii
Congressional delegation.''
In a related comment, an air tour operator argues that the FAA's
policy of ``equivalent level of safety'' should move the agency to
either eliminate SFAR 71 or to get Part 135 in line with it, if the
agency is not going to issue a national rule anytime soon.
Another commenter states that the FAA should present a new version
of SFAR 71 or replace it with a national rule.
Numerous pilots state that the rule is inherently unfair. If air
tour operators under Part 135 can fly at a 300-foot altitude over
congested areas in the United States mainland, why should Hawaii pilots
be restricted to 1,500 feet?
FAA Response
The FAA is not certain what the commenters are attempting to say in
its discussion of the advantage enjoyed by Congressional interest of
Hawaii, so it will not discuss that portion of the comment.
The SFAR has been in effect without substantive change since 1994,
and it has been successful in reducing the rate of air tour accidents
in Hawaii. This final rule continues SFAR 71 with no changes other than
the elimination of the expiration date; it allows SFAR 71 to continue
until further notice from the FAA. The FAA continues to work on a
proposed national air tour safety rule that could, if adopted,
supersede the SFAR.
To the extent that any commenter believes that it is only fair to
have the altitude restriction and standoff distances in SFAR 71 apply
to all part 135 air tour operators nationally, the FAA responds as
follows: First, the existing SFAR and the SFAR adopted today apply to
all air tour operators in Hawaii regardless of whether they are
conducting tours under parts 91, 121 or 135. Second, as we have
previously stated, the FAA is considering whether aviation safety
requires that the longstanding air tour safety rules in Hawaii should
be applied nationally and whether Part 91 commercial air tour operators
should be required to operate under part 135.
The FAA disagrees with some commenters' argument that the Hawaii
SFAR should be set aside until the national rule is developed. The FAA
received a series of recommendations from the NTSB, which it acted on,
and the resulting regulatory effort was SFAR 71. Those rules have been
effective, they have withstood court challenge, and the FAA will not
rescind the SFAR while it considers whether to issue a national rule.
Continue or Increase the Minimum Altitude and Standoff Distances;
Eliminate the Deviation Authority of SFAR 71.
More than 100 individuals, residents of Hawaii or persons who enjoy
the environment there, filed almost identical comments to support
maintaining or increasing the 1500-foot altitude, eliminating the lower
altitudes exceptions (deviations), and giving the state of Hawaii and
the National Park Service (NPS) the ability to restrict tour
overflights of state and national parks and wilderness areas. They
would like the SFAR's minimum altitude increased. Further, they object
to petitioners' request for an amendment that would permit a 300-foot
above the surface altitude for helicopters over uncongested areas. In
support, they state that ``government studies'' have demonstrated that
higher minimum altitudes save lives, constant noise adversely impacts
human health and can ruin the wilderness experience for hikers and
campers, and overflights disrupt Hawaii's wildlife. They also note that
the vibration from helicopters flying close to cliffs and precarious
rock structures may cause landslides or rock falls.
FAA Response
In this rulemaking, the FAA proposed only to eliminate the
expiration date. Comments regarding changing the altitude restriction
or eliminating deviations are beyond the scope of this rulemaking and
will not be considered.
In response to commenters who wish to give sole authority to
regulate the airspace of parks to the National Park Service (NPS) or
State governments, the FAA has sole and exclusive jurisdiction and
control over the navigable airspace. That power cannot be delegated to
the NPS or a State absent express Congressional legislation. The
comments are also beyond the scope of this rulemaking. As to national
parks, the FAA is working cooperatively with the NPS on development of
certain air tour management plans, as required by 14 CFR part 136,
National Parks Air Tour Management. This work is being conducted
independently of SFAR 71, and when appropriate, public participation
will be invited.
Frequency and Reporting Requirements
One individual comments that many pilots have discontinued the
practice of reporting position, altitude, and direction of flight or
report only the legal details required by SFAR 71.
FAA's Response
The SFAR does not require any special reporting by pilots. However,
since the purpose of the comment is unclear, the FAA offers the
following. As a matter of general practice, the FAA allows operators to
develop standard procedures as to how they operate in the scenic areas.
As long as the operating procedures are not in conflict with the
regulations, the FAA generally will not be involved. If the commenter
is saying that pilots are ignoring operating procedures that have been
approved by the FAA as part of the operator's manual, then the FAA
urges the commenter to provide the necessary information to the Flight
Standards District Office for investigation and appropriate action.
Using Landmarks for Reporting Requirements
Another commenter recommends that, to the extent there is an
increased risk of midair collisions, a system of common frequency and
reports over landmarks should be used.
FAA's Response
Development and implementation of a procedures manual for pilots
does not require regulatory action. Incorporation of landmarks and
common frequencies are issues that the operators and pilots
[[Page 60835]]
could agree on. In fact, a procedures manual used by operators in the
Grand Canyon Special Flight Rules Area was developed by the Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO) in cooperation with the operators and
is a primary document used in the training of new pilots.
The FAA continues to be puzzled by comments it has received on this
rule proposal. On the one hand, commenters are demanding that SFAR 71
needs to be rescinded, while on the other hand, commenters seem to want
more procedural regulation. The FAA is more than willing to provide
additional guidance and, as a result of recent accidents and the
comments received in this rulemaking, the FAA has decided to hold a
series of safety meetings to discuss these issues with pilots and
operators. Additional procedural guidance may result from these
meetings.
Public Disclosure of SFAR 71 Rulemaking Proceedings
A commenter requests that the Administrator produce for public
comment and inspection in the FAA docket all rulemaking documents
related to the promulgation of SFAR 71. This commenter believes that
this action would disclose the ``deficient safety analysis'' of SFAR 71
and also would highlight the Congressional pressure to limit helicopter
operations in Hawaii.
FAA's Response
Commenters should be aware that the FAA rulemaking process is a
public process, and issues involved with the rule are in a public
docket open for all persons to review. The Congressional record and
NTSB recommendations are also public documents that are readily
available through the Internet.
However, deliberative material and internal FAA working documents
used in the development of an NPRM or rule are not subject to public
scrutiny and do not belong in the public docket. These documents are
predecisional and are exempt from public review under the Freedom of
Information Act. Moreover, they are not helpful to anyone since the
decision of the FAA to issue a proposal may change as issues are
discussed internally within the FAA.
During the development of this proposal and disposition of comments
in this final rule, it has become apparent that many commenters believe
SFAR 71 is a noise rule and is not related to safety. The FAA cannot
change what commenters believe, nor will it try since neither this
commenter nor any other commenter has provided any evidence that the
FAA should support their opinions instead of the NTSB and the FAA's
aviation safety expertise.
In support of commenters, it is a matter of public record that the
Hawaii Congressional delegation believes low flying aircraft are
causing serious noise pollution. They have written numerous pieces of
correspondence to the FAA concerning this issue. Air tour operators do
not need to receive copies of internal FAA documents in order to know
what their delegation thinks because their public position is very
clear. On the other hand, the FAA has not been directed by any act of
Congress to regulate air tour operators in Hawaii for noise with the
exception of the recently passed the National Parks Air Tour Management
Act. That act has been codified as part 136 and its provisions were
developed by a National Parks Overflights Working Group (NPOWG), which
included an air tour operator from Hawaii.
No Justification for Altitude Restrictions
A commenter states that although accident statistics show that a
compelling argument can be made for the life vest requirement in SFAR
71, just the opposite is true of the altitude restriction. This
commenter notes that 77% of the accidents attributable to engine
failures occurred before the SFAR was issued; 23% occurred afterward.
The engines used in the pre-SFAR timeframe are no longer in use. The
engines used predominantly in the post-SFAR timeframe have proven very
reliable.
FAA's Response
The decrease in engine failures is encouraging; however, in-flight
engine failures (e.g., mechanical failures, fuel starvation) continue
to occur.
To the extent that commenters are suggesting that the altitude
restriction and associated increases in weather minimums are not
necessary, the FAA disagrees. The SFAR's life vest and altitude
requirements have been analyzed in the regulatory evaluation and each
measure provides a safety benefit. The altitude baseline in the SFAR,
which is higher than those altitudes suggested by some commenters,
gives a pilot a better opportunity to make a safe landing should an
engine failure occur. The FAA has granted deviations from the baseline
altitude of 1,500 feet to lower altitudes based on numerous factors,
including whether the terrain permits a safe landing and the
performance capabilities of the aircraft.
Additional Training as an Alternative
A commenter states that given the unique terrain and climate
features of Hawaii, if the FAA is really concerned about safety, it
should mandate additional training instead of imposing artificial
altitudes. Another commenter credits the Tour Operators Program of
Safety (TOPS), that has been in effect since the mid-1990's, with
providing great benefits to the safety of air tour operations in
Hawaii.
FAA's Response
The FAA considered the uniqueness of Hawaii when it issued SFAR 71
in 1994. Additional training may be necessary in the future but the FAA
does not consider such measures necessary at this time.
Operators are always free to provide additional training; the
regulations contain only minimum requirements. The FAA encourages
programs such as TOPS that can provide pilots additional training
benefits and help develop a culture of compliance.
The FAA's Claim That the SFAR Has Increased Safety Is Misleading
Some commenters believe that the altitude restriction has not been
the contributing cause to the decrease in accidents, but rather cite
three factors: (1) Efforts of air tour operators and pilots to increase
training and standards; (2) the replacement of helicopters with engines
that had a high failure rate with helicopters with reliable engines;
and (3) a number of safety devices, such as the use of flotation
devices, that were mandated by the SFAR. This commenter states that it
is the operators' opinion that the altitude restriction may have added
to the accident potential.
Other commenters state that the intent of the SFAR was to reduce
accidents and fatalities/injuries due to loss of power in cruise.
FAA's Response
The FAA agrees that the overall decrease in the accident rate may
be due to a number of unquantifiable factors. However, as stated
previously, the altitude restrictions in SFAR 71 are needed. The
reasons the FAA issued the SFAR, with the altitude restriction, are
articulated in the 1994 final rule and discussed in the extensions. The
stated intent of the 1,500-foot altitude provision is not to prevent
accidents solely due to loss of power in cruise. Comments that the SFAR
increases the potential for accident have been addressed in prior
rules, and the FAA disagrees with such comments.
[[Page 60836]]
Accident Rates
Using the figures that supported the original promulgation of SFAR
71, a commenter concludes that the accident rate for helicopters was
one-fourth that of airplanes. Between 1982 and 1994, air tour airplanes
had an accident rate of over 24 per million flights, and helicopters
had a rate of 5.9 per million flights. This commenter maintains that
the accident rates for helicopters in Hawaii were lower than many other
states. Further, the commenter posits that the drop in the accident
rate for helicopters is due to better equipment, not the SFAR, and that
the majority of the accidents from 1982 to 1994 were because of
mechanical failures.
FAA's Response
The commenter is incorrect; the analysis addresses the benefits of
the rule to airplanes and helicopters separately. While the commenter
correctly cites information in the FAA's 1994 regulatory evaluation
(which are also incorporated in the evaluation for this rulemaking)
regarding airplane and helicopter accident rates, the cited accident
rates only apply to accidents attributable to weather and flying low,
and are not a comprehensive rate for all accidents which the commenter
apparently assumes. The FAA's estimate of accidents avoided is only
based on accidents rates related to specific provisions of the rule and
are not related to accidents due to mechanical failures. Since
accidents attributed to mechanical failures are not included, the
helicopter accident rate is not misleading.
Affordability Analysis
A commenter notes that the FAA stated that the drop in business
since the enactment of the SFAR was due to the nature of tourism. This
commenter claims that the majority of helicopter services have lost a
great deal of income due to a lack of repeat customers because of the
altitude and standoff distances. The claim is that prior to SFAR 71
almost 25% of the air tour business was made up of returning tourists.
FAA's Response
The FAA cannot use this cost estimate because the information is
insufficient and undocumented. It is also at odds with a comment by a
large helicopter operator that the helicopter tour industry in Hawaii
``has flown well over 80,000 hours per year in every year since 1985.''
Cost-benefit Analysis
A commenter contests ``the elusive cost-benefit analysis'' because
no real analysis, statistics, or time parameters are provided. This
commenter claims that the FAA promised, both in 1997 and 2000, that
such an analysis would be provided in a final rule, which has not been
forthcoming. The commenter further remarked that the estimated number
of fatalities avoided lacked sufficient detail and another commenter
questioned the basis for the accident rate referenced in the NPRM.
FAA's Response
The regulatory evaluation provided a list of all Hawaii air tour
accidents related to the provisions of SFAR 71 from 1982 to June 30,
2003. The commenters included a listing of helicopter accidents in
Hawaii covering the period from November 19, 1985--July 23, 2003 based
on NTSB data. The FAA used the same database but for the time period of
1982-June 30, 2003 and with some differences in the results. The
commenters included three helicopter accidents that the NTSB narratives
do not indicate were sightseeing or air tours and therefore are not
incorporated in the FAA's analysis.\1\ The number of accidents,
fatalities, and injuries associated with each of the major provisions
of the rule were extracted and the accident rate per million air tour
flights was calculated for helicopters and airplanes. The number of air
tour flights was derived from the FAA's Terminal Area Forecast, the
1994 FAA final regulatory evaluation and FAA operations specification
data on air tour operators.\2\ The accident rate was determined for the
1982-1994 and 1995-2002 time periods. The difference between the post-
SFAR and the pre-SFAR accident rates were then applied to the number of
forecasted helicopter and airplane air tour flights to arrive at the
estimated number of accidents that would be avoided by adoption of the
minimum altitude and weather provision of the rule. The 1982-1994-
accident rate related to helicopter flotation gear requirement was
applied to the forecast number of helicopter flights to estimate the
number of fatalities that would be avoided by adoption of the flotation
gear provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Accidents not identified by NTSB as air tours: LAX86FA243,
LAX87FA112, and LAX01LA083. The first 2 accidents occurred in the
take-off phase of operation and the third during a pre-departure
check. None appear to be related to the SFAR provisions. The FAA has
therefore not added these accidents to the database used in the
regulatory analysis.
\2\ FAA Office of Aviation, Policy, and Plans: Terminal Area
Forecast, Fiscal years 2002-2020. Final Regulatory Evaluation, Final
Regulatory Flexibility Determination, and Trade Impact Assessment:
``Air Tour Operators in the State of Hawaii'' August 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Final Rule
The FAA continues the safety requirements of SFAR 71 without a
termination date because of the regulation's continuing success in
reducing the air tour accident rate in Hawaii and the proven
effectiveness of the SFAR's requirements.
Justification for Immediate Adoption
The FAA finds that good cause exists under 5 U.S.C. 553(d) for this
final rule to become effective upon issuance. The FAA notes that this
final rule does not change the long-standing requirements of SFAR 71
for air tour operators in Hawaii; it only eliminates the termination
date.
Environmental Review
In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, the FAA has determined that
this amendment is categorically excluded from environmental review
under section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act. In
1994 the original SFAR 71 established procedural, operational, and
equipment safety requirements for air tour aircraft in the state of
Hawaii. This amendment will maintain those requirements and is part of
an ongoing action. The continuation of SFAR 71 will not involve any
significant impacts to the human environment and the FAA has determined
that there are no extraordinary circumstances. This rule does not
change the existing environment and is not likely to effect listed,
endangered or threatened species. Comments requesting that the FAA ban
overflights from critical habitat are beyond the scope of this rule.
Regulatory Evaluation Summary
Proposed changes to Federal regulations must undergo several
economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each
Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies
to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities.
Third, the Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. sections 2531-2533)
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing
U.S. standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider
[[Page 60837]]
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
for U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Public Law 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State,
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation.)
In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined this rule: (1) Has
benefits that justify its costs, is not a ``significant regulatory
action'' as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, and is
not ``significant'' as defined in DOT's Regulatory Policies and
Procedures; (2) will have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities; (3) will not constitute a barrier
to international trade; and (4) will not impose an unfunded mandate on
state, local, or tribal governments, or on the private sector. The FAA
has placed these analyses in the docket and summarized them below.
Costs
The FAA estimates the total cost of this rule at $29.8 million or
$20.9 million, discounted. The costs reflect maintenance and operating
costs attributable to flotation devices and life vests, operating costs
required for calculating helicopter performance plans and providing a
passenger briefing for emergency egress in the event of a water
landing. Lost opportunity costs will also be incurred due to the
minimum weather provisions.
The rule requires single-engine helicopters conducting air tours
beyond the shore of any island to be either amphibious or equipped with
flotation devices. The capital costs associated with this provision are
reflected in the maintenance costs. In addition, there are operating
costs from increased fuel consumption. The cost for required float
inspections is estimated at $4.0 million over a 10-year period, $2.8
million, discounted. The helicopters will incur an operating penalty
from increased fuel consumption due to the extra weight of the floats.
The FAA estimates the 10-year weight-related costs at $4.6 million or
$3.2 million, discounted. The total operating costs of these provisions
over a 10-year period are estimated at $8.6 million or $6.0 million,
discounted.
Each person on board an air tour helicopter is required to wear a
life vest. Air tour operators in Hawaii had provided life vests aboard
helicopters prior to the issuance of SFAR 71 in 1994 and thus already
complied with the equipment requirement so there are no acquisition
costs associated with this provision. Prior to SFAR 71, the life vests
were stowed under the passenger's seat. Since the issuance of SFAR 71,
passengers have to wear a life vest during the helicopter air tour.
This results in additional continuing maintenance costs associated with
these life vests since the rule requires the vests to be worn as well
as a weight penalty. The 10-year cost totals $485,000 or $341,000,
discounted.
Each helicopter air tour operator must develop and comply with a
performance plan. The development costs have already been incurred but
each pilot must complete the performance plan before each flight. The
10-year cost of preparing the performance plans are estimated at $4.9
million or $3.5 million, discounted.
The pilot in command must ensure each passenger is briefed on water
ditching procedures, use of required life vests, and emergency egress
from the aircraft in event of a water landing. The 10-year cost of this
provision is estimated at $8.1 million or $5.7 million, discounted.
Opportunity costs will also be incurred due to the minimum weather
provisions. The total lost net revenue due to cancelled air tours is
estimated at $7.6 million or $5.3 million, discounted.
Benefits
The FAA has quantified the benefits of the life vests and minimum
altitude provisions and estimates the monetary benefits of these
provisions at $125.3 million. An estimated 39 fatalities will be
avoided, if the rule is 100 percent effective. This rule would be cost
beneficial if it were only 24 percent effective. The benefits of the
briefing provision are reflected in the life vest provision. The
benefits of the performance plan have not been quantified.
Between 1982 and 1994 there were 3 helicopter water-landing
accidents in which 8 persons drowned. These 3 accidents occurred in the
course of an estimated 1.176 million flights or 2.55 accidents per
million helicopter air tour flights. Applying this accident rate to the
forecast of 1.157 million flights over the next 10-years results in 8
fatalities averted and a monetary benefit of $24 million.
There were 7 helicopter accidents between 1982 and 1994 related to
weather or flying low. These accidents resulted in 11 fatalities, 9
serious and 12 minor injuries. The helicopter air tour accident rate
related to weather equaled 5.95 accidents per million flights. Between
1995 and 2002 there were 2 helicopter accidents resulting in 13
fatalities and a weather related accident rate of 2.43 accidents per
million flights. The difference in accident rates was 3.514 accidents
per million flights. Based on a forecast of 1.16 million helicopter
tours over the next 10-years, applying this accident rate results in 4
accidents avoided and 11 fatalities averted and monetary benefits of
$38.8 million.
Airplane air tour operators experienced 5 weather related accidents
between 1982 and 1994 (24.04 weather-related accidents per million
operations) but only 1 weather-related accident between 1995 and 2002
(6.9 weather-related accidents per million operations). These 6
accidents resulted in 39 fatalities and 4 serious injuries. The
difference in accident rates was 17.14 per million operations. Applying
this accident rate differential to the forecast of 183,000 flights over
the next 10-years results in 3 accidents avoided and 20 fatalities
averted and a monetary benefit of $62.5 million.
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor,
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes,
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the
rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of small
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and
small governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. If the agency determines that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in
the RFA.
However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the
head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis
is not required. The certification must include a statement providing
the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be
clear.
[[Page 60838]]
The FAA conducted the required review of this rule and determined
that it will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 603 of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Federal Aviation Administration has
prepared the following final regulatory flexibility analysis.
Reasons Why Agency Action Is Being Considered
The FAA will continue the existing safety standards in SFAR 71
without a termination date as a result of the reduction in accidents
and incidents involving air tour operators in Hawaii and NTSB
recommendations. The rationale for the major provisions of the rule are
summarized below:
Safety provisions addressing the risks of beyond the shore
operations. Based on an analysis of the risks of beyond the shore
operations and NTSB recommendations, the FAA concludes that the
benefits of these provisions justify the costs. Based on survivors'
testimony, life vests alone are insufficient in preventing loss of life
in helicopter accidents over water. Without floats, helicopters sink
very quickly upon impact, giving occupants little time to exit the
aircraft. The FAA believes that helicopter floats, in conjunction with
life vests and pre-flight briefing on water ditching procedures, will
significantly improve the chances of survival. Therefore, this rule
requires life vests and passenger briefings for all air tours and
floats for helicopters.
Provisions addressing weather. Between 1982 and 1994 there were 12
weather related accidents in Hawaii while between 1994 and 2002 there
were 3 weather related accidents. This illustrates the effectiveness of
the existing SFAR 71 weather related provisions and warrant their
continuation.
Summary of Significant Issues Raised In Comment Period
The FAA received four comments related to economic evaluation
issues, and the FAA has determined none of the comments were
significant. One comment mistakenly interpreted accident rate data
presented in the economic analysis to support removing the altitude
restriction on helicopters. Another comment questioned the basis for
the accident rate referenced in the NPRM, and a third claimed a lack of
detail on the estimated number of fatalities avoided. The FAA has
provided a detailed response to these comments and determined the
analysis questioned is accurate and complete. A fourth comment claimed
the rule has resulted in a loss of income due to a lack of repeat
customers, which prior to 1994 accounted for almost 25 percent of tour
business. The comment was not supported by any documentation and was
contrary to a comment by a small, but well-known operator, that the
helicopter tour industry in Hawaii ``has flown well over 80,000 hours
per year in every year since 1985''.
Statement of Objectives and Legal Basis
The objective of this rule is to continue a higher level of safety
for Hawaii air tours. Under the United States Code, the FAA
Administrator is required to consider the following matter, among
others, as being in the public interest: assigning, maintaining, and
enhancing safety and security as the highest priorities in air
commerce. [See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 40101(d)(1).] Additionally, it is the
FAA Administrator's statutory duty to carry out her responsibilities
``in a way that best tends to reduce or eliminate the possibility or
recurrence of accidents in air transportation.'' [See 49 U.S.C. Sec.
44701(c).] Accordingly, this rule will amend Title 14 of the Code of
Federal Regulations to continue the safety requirements of air tour
operations in Hawaii, without a termination date.
Description of Small Entities Affected
The FAA concludes that all of the entities affected by the rule are
small according to thresholds established by the Small Business
Administration (i.e., employ fewer than 1,500 employees). An estimated
6 part 91 operators and 24 part 135 operators will be affected by the
rule. The part 91 operators own about 11 aircraft, while the part 135
operators have about 80 aircraft. This rule will impose total
annualized costs per operator of approximately $99,000. According to a
Small Business Administration analysis of Bureau of Census data for
non-scheduled air transportation firms, firms with fewer than 500
employees have average revenues of $1.87 million. The estimated cost to
each of these small entities is approximately 5.3 percent of the
average revenue of non-scheduled air transportation firms with fewer
than 500 employees based on the SBA's Census data cited.
Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other Compliance Requirements
The annualized cost for completing the performance plan and
conducting the passenger briefing will impose average annualized costs
per operator of approximately $43,500.
Overlapping, Duplicative, or Conflicting Federal Rules
The rule will not overlap, duplicate, or conflict with existing
Federal Rules.
Analysis of Alternatives
Affected operators and helicopter air tour pilots have petitioned
the FAA to amend SFAR 71. They argue that SFAR 71's 1,500 feet minimum
altitude requirement is cumbersome and lacks flexibility in dynamic
circumstances. The petitioners also maintain that allowing air tour
flights as low as 300 feet above the surface would make SFAR 71 safer
in certain circumstances.
The FAA has considered the petitioners' views in formulating this
rule. The issues raised are similar to comments received by the agency
during the three SFAR rulemaking preceding this rule. The FAA concludes
that 1,500 feet provides a pilot with more distance, and thus time, to
avoid an accident or to deal with an error. An altitude of 300 feet
provides 80 percent less distance and thus, much less reaction time.
Affordability Analysis
The FAA lacks reliable revenue and profit data on the individual
entities affected by this rule, but the estimated cost to each of these
small entities is approximately 5.3 percent of the average revenue of
non-scheduled air transportation firms with fewer than 500 employees
based on the SBA's Census data. Hawaii air tour operators have been
subject to the provisions of this rule since 1994.
Business Closure Analysis
The FAA estimates that none of the operators currently providing
air tour flights will elect to stop providing the service. These
operators have been complying with these provisions since 1994. While
there are fewer operators today than in 1994, the cause cannot be
directly attributed to SFAR 71, but rather the vagaries and nature of
the tourism market. New air tour operators have entered the market
after making the business decision to accept the provisions of this
rule.
Disproportionality Analysis
All Hawaiian entities in the air tour market are small.
Accordingly, the costs imposed by this rule will be borne almost
entirely by small businesses. The estimated costs are proportional to
the frequency of operations and thus the burden is not
disproportionate. Air tour safety in Hawaii has been significantly
improved, and the FAA believes that the only way to continue this is to
maintain these higher standards on these entities.
[[Page 60839]]
Key Assumptions Analysis
The FAA has made several conservative assumptions in this analysis,
which may have resulted in an overestimate of the costs of the rule.
For example, the revenue loss resulting from tour cancellations due to
the minimum flight altitude provision has been partially offset by the
FAA's issuance of ``deviations'' allowing lower minimum altitudes and
thus fewer tour cancellations. In addition, the FAA assumes that the
pilot in command will conduct all pre-flight briefings but the
provision only requires the pilot to ``ensure that each passenger has
been briefed''. The briefing could be recorded or provided by a lower
paid employee. Also, the helicopter life vest costs may be
overestimated since there is a voluntary industry standard to which 13
helicopter tour operators subscribe that requires occupants to wear a
personal flotation device.
International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from
establishing any standards or engaging in related activities that
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not
considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that
they be the basis for U.S. standards.
In accordance with the above statute, the FAA has assessed the
potential effect of this final rule and has determined that it would
have only a domestic impact and therefore no affect on any trade-
sensitive activity.
Paperwork Reduction Act
SFAR 71 contains information collection requirements. OMB approval
(No. 2120-0620) has been extended through January 31, 2004.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act) is intended,
among other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal
mandates on State, local and tribal governments. Title II of the Act
requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing
the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule
that may result in the expenditure of $100 million or more (adjusted
annually for inflation) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.''
This final rule does not contain such a mandate. The requirements
of Title II do not apply.
Federalism Implications
The regulations herein will not have substantial direct effects on
the State, on the relationship between the national government and the
states, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive
Order 12612, the FAA certifies that this regulation will not have
sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a
Federalism Assessment.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 91
Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety.
14 CFR Part 121
Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Charter flights,
Safety, Transportation.
14 CFR Part 135
Air taxi, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety.
The Amendment
0
The Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR parts 91, 121, and
135 as follows:
PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES
0
1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40103, 40113, 40120, 44101, 44111,
44701, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 44717, 44722, 46306,
46315, 46316, 46502, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508, 47528-47531.
PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL
OPERATIONS
0
2. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 44701-
44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903-
44904, 44912, 46105.
PART 135--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER AND ON-DEMAND OPERATIONS
0
3. The authority citation for part 135 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44705, 44709,
44711-44713, 44715-44717, 44722.
0
4. In parts 91, 121, and 135, SFAR No. 71--Special Operating Rules For
Air Tour Operators In The State of Hawaii, Section 8 is revised to read
as follows:
SFAR No. 71--Special Operating Rules For Air Tour Operators In The
State Of Hawaii
* * * * *
Section 8. Termination date. This SFAR No. 71 shall remain in
effect until further notice.
Issued in Washington, DC, on October 20, 2003.
Marion C. Blakey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 03-26836 Filed 10-21-03; 10:39 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
Browse by Year
/ 2003
/ October
/ Thursday, October 23, 2003
Internet Marketing - Phoenix Landscaping - Phoenix Pools - Credit Cards
|
|